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I will draw inferences from lessons that are associated not with biotechnology,
but with how consumers deal with risks in other contexts. I will discuss
insights gained from cognitive psychology and research on consumer attitudes.
And I will also touch on economics, drawing principally on my own work with
colleagues. We have addressed issues associated with how one can use
environmental and health risks, both voluntary and involuntary, and the rules
of risk communication, to inform the current discussion of GMOs and
biotechnology.
Will consumer attitudes, in the United States and elsewhere, substantially
retard biotechnological innovations that might ultimately affect the food
supply? If that question is meaningful, then we must ask a subsequent one:
does the accumulated experience and research in risk communication, and
what we know about how to present risk information to consumers, suggest
that there are ways to influence the answer? That is, can we, through policy
measures, undertaken both in the public and in the private sectors, change the
responses that we would otherwise expect if risk information were not
presented? And then, ultimately: do we know enough now to take immediate
action?
Food-production decisions must be taken in the context that food is a world-
wide commodity. Consumers are heterogeneous. They have diverse information
bases, and culture is a very important contextual issue in Europe. Price and
quality attributes, as well as information, are important for decision making.
We have to provide value and change the perceptions of value either directly or
indirectly through price, in order to see a consumer response. It is important to
understand—not just in the area of GM and biotechnology, but in areas such as
the environment—that the production technology used to deliver a food, or any
other product, often becomes a part of the product-attribute set. Consumers
have preferences, and understanding them helps determine how information
associated with that product should be delivered.
In this country, multiple domestic agencies affect food policy and perceived
safety. In the world community we know from sanitary and phytosanitary
standards that trading rules are affected by perceptions of risk and efforts to
maintain or harmonize the information on, and the treatment of, risk. Also, it
is important to understand that the science base of most reporting—not the
New York Times, but the local and regional newspapers—is extremely limited.
Consequently, the ability to explain technical information is also constrained.
In delivering a message, it is necessary to recognize that media are the
consumers’ primary source of information about a whole host of issues.
EXPERIMENTS IN RISK PERCEPTION
I will describe three social-science experiments (not surveys) that provide
evidence that consumers’ subjective perceptions of risk should be taken
seriously. These are matters that are not variable day to day, that do influence
behavior, and that can be influenced. Information and its source clearly do
modify risk perceptions, and I think we understand enough to provide specific
guidance on how to structure that information. Clearly the process is context-
and problem-specific. So one needs to understand how consumers see the
problem in order to adapt what we know about what is important about the
source of risk. The cultural context affects how one delivers a message and
provides information.
You cannot consider risk perception in psychology without coming across the
names of Paul Slovic, Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Sarah Lichtenstein.
Their central point is that risk has attributes. You cannot think of probabilities
of events in isolation from whether the source of uncertainty is voluntary or
involuntary, whether the process is perceived to be known or unknown, and
whether the outcomes are dreaded. People do not necessarily behave like the
calculating agents that economists and others imagine, but, where the issues
are personal, the consumer is likely to behave rationally in acquiring and using
information.
In the area of economics, there has been a lot of research on the effects of
labels, for example when the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) changed
advertising rules on fiber and cancer. Economists examined the change—the
Where the issues are personal, the consumer is likely to
behave rationally in acquiring and using information.
demands for cereals with fiber before and after—and attempted to infer the
consequences of the label. Likewise, we can consider organic and non-organic
produce side by side and ask about differences in demand. However, it is hard
to go meaningfully backwards from these observations, which is why I am in
favor of more social-science experiments.
Tom Hoban’s surveys in 1995 and 1997 in the United States, and in 1998 in
Japan (see Table 1), demonstrated that when unprompted American and
Japanese consumers were asked what they feel is the greatest threat to food
safety, biotechnology was at the bottom of the list. When prompted, bio-
technology remained near the bottom of the list.
Hoban adds an important qualifier—and this is the kind of information that
comes from consumer-attitude research—we need to consider the fact that
people answer these questions spontaneously, typically over the telephone.
They have had little time to think about them, yet the responses may form the
basis for policy decisions. Therefore, we should consider alternative sources of
information in framing the policy debate.
Consumer attitudes alone are not enough. How about surveys and experi-
ments? Economists are fond of surveys that offer stated-choice information, and
are fond of trying to mimic natural scientists in conducting controlled
TABLE 1. RESEARCH ON CONSUMER ATTITUDES: “WHAT DO YOU FEEL
IS THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF THE FOODS YOU EAT?”
(HOBAN, 1999)
United States Japan
1995, 1997 1998
 (%) (%)
Unprompted
Pesticide residues 16 45
Additives or preservatives 2 34
Microbial contamination 69 7
Antibiotics or hormones 1 4
Irradiated foods 0 1
Biotechnology 0 1
Prompted
Pesticide residues 66 80
Additives or preservatives 20 52
Microbial contamination 77 49
Antibiotics or hormones 42 62
Irradiated foods 29 56
Biotechnology 16 8
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experiments in the laboratory that typically involve students who are offered
different choices. And in another category called a simulated market, we sell
real products in a control setting and have consumers actually buy them in this
limited setting; of course, typically the consumer is told that it is an experi-
ment, therefore, it is harder to accurately draw inferences.
I will describe three real-world, long-term, large-scale, social-science
experiments. Two involve radon, which, as a naturally occurring gas associated
with lung cancer, has an important attribute: it is an involuntary source of risk.
In one of the two experiments, individuals were recruited to have their homes
monitored for radon. The objective of our research team— including New York
State Energy Research and Development Authority and the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—was to try to communicate
effectively the risk message associated with radon to these homeowners as part
of designing what ultimately became, in the mid-1990s, the EPA’s Citizens Guide
to Radon. It was a panel study involving four interviews of 2,300 households,
and tracking their behavior over a period of four years, 1986 to 1989. We
examined risk-perceptions, and looked for mitigating behavior.
The second study, undertaken by the same team, took place in Maryland,
again in the late 1980s. Three thousand households were involved over a period
of a year and a half to two years. The objective was to inform households that
might not otherwise know anything about the risks of radon and induce them
to take action by having their homes tested for it.
The third experiment was finished recently (with support from the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation). It involved approximately 12,600 households, in
conjunction with a still-on-going survey—the Health and Retirement Survey—
with a demographically matched sample. We examined a voluntary risk:
cigarette smoking. Surely everyone knows that cigarettes are harmful. Why then
do people of 51 to 61 years of age continue to smoke? What do they believe the
consequences will be? What would be salient messages that would change
smokers’ beliefs?
From each of these experiments I will draw lessons relevant to biotechnology
and GMOs.
INVOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS — RADON
The experimental design for the New York study involved six brochures in
specifically designed categories. The categories varied the amount of quantita-
tive information and the amount of specific guidance given to each household
about the risk or exposure to radon.
After four interviews and multiple years, we found clearly that an informa-
tional message that presented exceptionally clear guidance, that said, “Do ‘X’
and you will be safe,” was the most effective message in communicating the
risk. Also, we found that people subscribe to the notion that they can undo
damage they have done to themselves by inaction. Reversibility of the process
was extraordinarily important to people’s responses. Each brochure was
randomly assigned to a different group just as for a field experiment. So,
each member of the group during the course of the experiment received only
one type of informational source from us.
About 10% more people took some action as a result of receiving the
quantitative informational brochure in comparison to those who received a
standard government fact sheet. In terms of radon level, an eight-fold increase
would have been needed to have the same level of effectiveness as that
information booklet.
The second study involved three sets of households in three communities
in Maryland: Hagerstown, Frederick, and Randallstown. The experimental
design was carefully constructed. Frederick and Hagerstown received different
information campaigns, and Randallstown, the control, received nothing.
Posters were put up around Frederick, and there was community involvement.
We recruited the mayor and the town council to monitor their own homes; they
were on television and radio, and were very much involved in the process. In
Hagerstown, information was delivered with telephone bills to explain radon,
and posters were displayed around the community, but nothing else was done.
The gray bars in Figure 1 show baseline-survey data: percentages of people
who monitored their homes for radon, which was our outcome measure.
The black bars show the results of the experiment. We saw a 10% increase
in monitoring as a result of the intensive involvement in Frederick, and next
to nothing in the other two communities. These data show that with close
continuous involvement, contributions from community leaders, and a
personalized message, positive results are possible.
Figure 1. Fraction of people in baseline and follow-up surveys
who had tested for radon.
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VOLUNTARY HEALTH RISKS – SMOKING
How do smokers regard the risks from smoking? Advertisements by the
American Lung Association and the American Cancer Association are frequent
on radio and television, as well as in the print media, suggest that we interpret
simple messages in a direct and narrow way. If a smoker quits the habit, then
the adverse health effects will be reversed, eventually. Smokers use that message
to guide their behavior incorrectly: “I will stop smoking when I am 73, get
better in about 18 months, and then play tennis.” Unless they have lost a
spouse or parents, or seen someone else with a smoking-related disease, they
do not accept the message that there is a risk to them.
Personalization is very important. Every two years since 1992 the same
individuals were interviewed for an hour. The question reported here is,
“What are the chances that you will live to 75 or more, on a scale of zero to
100?” Because these individuals were followed every two years and complete
health records were kept, it was possible to observe the effects of health shocks
on their longevity perceptions. We considered all possible health outcomes
between two interviews, and classified shocks as either smoking-related—
lung cancer, other serious lung diseases, and heart disease—or general. In
Table 2 a negative sign implies a revision of the expectation of living to 75 or
more as a result either of a general health shock or of a smoking-related health
shock. Current smokers did not react to anything but a smoking-related health
shock. Those who had never smoked and former smokers reacted to both types
of shock equivalently.
Sometimes you have to hit people over the head with a message. And that
message should address what is at risk, not necessarily probabilities of the
event at risk. In this context, the message should not be the probability of
dying from smoking, it should address the mode of transition to death. You
have to determine from the people specifically what concerns them. You must
communicate with them in that context, and then work from there to develop
a message. The bottom line is that perceptions are informative and they do
affect behavior.
TABLE 2. RISK UPDATING MODEL FOR ‘LIVE TO 75’ (T-TEST) DATA.
Current Former Never
 smoker  smoker  smoked
Smoking-related –0.1237 –0.0692 –0.1095
health shocks (–3.84) (–3.18) (–3.31)
General health 0.0076 –0.0665 –0.0551
shocks (0.27) (–3.69) (–2.74)
As for influencing the demand for cigarettes, we found that people do not
passively accept information from experts. The information must be personal
and tangible. Risk communication requires listening first.
SPECIFIC LESSONS
Consumers generally want complete protection and not complex trade-offs.
It is fruitless to tell them that they can do X, Y, and Z and reduce their marginal
risk by a defined amount, although, as an economist, I wish it were otherwise.
Unfortunately, they do not want to hear it. Honest, full disclosure is central
to building trust. Trust can be very difficult to earn, and very quickly lost.
Perceived irreversible choices—and the key issue is irreversibility—are central
when concerns are serious.
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Q: On one of the overheads you had a Japan/United States comparison
on perceived risks associated with food. There was a tremendous difference.
Microbial contamination was high in the US, and pesticides and other additives
were important in Japan. What do you think the basis for those differences
might be?
A: A considerable amount of research has been done by economists,
psychologists, and sociologists on the role of culture in perception of what’s
safe. Sheila Jasanoff, a lawyer with a background in political science and
sociology at the Kennedy School, suggests that it is important to understand
the context associated with how risky activities are regulated in different
countries, and how information is delivered as a starting point for understand-
ing differences in perceptions. So it is not simply a question that Japanese
and Europeans are different from Americans, it is the policy infrastructure
that builds trust—that which delivers information, that which delivers
process and product safety to consumers, that which monitors the sources
of involuntary risk. That context builds up a set of prior expectations as to
what comes from outside the market and inside the market. And that context
is central to how they respond to different sources of risk.
Trust can be very difficult to earn, and very quickly lost.
Perceived irreversible choices—and the key issue is
irreversibility—are central when concerns are serious.
Q: How do you go about defining a risk-communications strategy for
perceived risk in the case of GMOs as opposed to real risk, for example, radon?
A: At the time we were doing this in the 1980s, there was very little public
information on radon. The individuals involved in those studies, both in
Maryland and New York, did not realize that they faced this risk. So there is
a parallel. I don’t mean that to be defensive. I am simply saying that in many
situations, when risks are real, people will not know about them. The beginning
point is listening and trying to understand from individuals what is important
about the choices they made with respect to voluntary risks. This can be
achieved via a series of activities: focus groups, cognitive interviews, and
a whole series of other one-on-one interactions with consumers to identify
a template of attributes that are important to the typical person. Then match
that template with the attributes that are associated with the product or process
that might be the source of a perceived risk. An economist will also tell you
that you have to identify a set of choices that are consequential from a financial
perspective to consumers and identify how they respond in those consequential
choices to different information sets. That gives you the beginnings of a
template for a risk-communication program. You have seen people take an
action that means something to them with consequences in response to
different kinds of information sets: you have an “if check,” if you will, on the
importance of the information process. It is hard to give you a blueprint for
every single problem, because each one has a different attribute set to start
with. What I have described is the process of developing a communication
program.
Q: You mentioned that consumers prefer complete protection over trade-offs.
Are you saying that they want to be assured of absolute safety?
A: I am not saying that they want to be assured of absolute safety. But they
want a very clear message that says, if they do something there will be a
response. Let’s take a tangible example. In the case of radon, at the time we
were presenting the information associated with mitigation, there was really no
experience with the production technologies that were associated with
removing radon from basements. So, we were, in effect, stating: if you ventilate
your basement it will probably work, if you seal up the floor on the underside of
the first floor, it might reduce radon. If you install a $3,000 ventilator in your
basement, we know it will work but we don’t know by how much. Those sorts
of messages are not very effective. If, on the other hand, you can say that if you
reduce your consumption of cigarettes by X packs in the course of a typical
month, you’ll reduce your chances of walking around with an oxygen tank
from five out of ten to two out of ten—that’s a salient, direct message. And they
prefer the latter to the former. It’s not complete protection. They don’t want
uncertainty over the mechanism that is going to protect them. They want to
know what will work.
